Palestinian refugees, a material and spiritual homeland
Shadia Matar
Physical force, psychological intimidation, terror and legitimate fear for one's own safety were behind the expulsion or exodus of Palestinian refugees from their own homeland, Palestine, in 1948. Forced after 1948 catastrophe to come to terms with the unbearable burden of exile, it was almost as a way of denying their exile that Palestinian refugees guarded the keys of their old houses and the deeds to their lands, still keeping every document that attested to their association with lost homes. They held on these documents as though they might need them at any moment. And even if not, at least they proved that the owners were not merely derelict nomads, but people with status and rights, the owners of houses and property. Even some of those who refused to leave or remained in their own homes at the risk of their lives eventually became refugees in their own country. They had to leave their villages, emptied of their citizens, ad the Israeli army gathered them and moved them forcibly to one village. The lands and properties they left behind came under state supervision and were declared absentee property. The Palestinians, as a nation, were victimized in 1948. They lost much more than homes and property. They lost a home-land. And Palestinian consciousness-even of those who were not expelled or did not flee during 1948 - has been permeated, mouded by this deep tragedy.
Over the years UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Work Agency), continued to refine its classification of who is a Palestinian refugee, until the present working definition was reached. It states that "A Palestinian refugee is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of the conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood and took refuge in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank, Gaza).
Although the number of refugees in this category had increased from 914.000 in 1950 to over three million by 1995, there were several groups of Palestinian displaced by the Arab-Israeli conflict who did not fit UNRWA's definition.
They included several hundred of thousand Palestinians in "Frontier villages" on the Jordan side of the armistic lines who lost their livelihood when they were cut off from fields on the Israel side of border: several Gazans in a similar situation: several thousand Bedouins cut off from tradizional grazing areas, and several thousand needy Palestinians in areas beyond UNRWA operations. In the early 1950s, there were more than 300.000 people in these categories who did not fit UNRWA's refugee definition; they were called "other claimants" whom UNRWA was unable to assist because of lack of funds.
The June 1967 war created a new category-about 800.000 according to Palestinian estimation while Israel officially refers to 200.000, this new category, who were refugees a second time having left their original homes in 1948, and their temporary residences in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. These include Palestinians who again fled for their safety hoping to be able to return once the bombing and shooting stopped; those who were caught outside the country when the war broke out; those whom Israel expelled on grounds of incitement against the occupation, and those who were barred from returning because their Israeli travel documents were expired before they had the chance to renew them.
The different categories of 1967 refugees, on the other hand, cannot understand why they are prevented from returning to their homes and lands in the West Bank and Gaza If - with a modicum of understanding - the return of the 1948 refugees to their homes inside Israel can be considered a threat to the Jewish majority and demographic balance in Israel, no one can comprehend why Israel oppose the return of 1967 refuges or displaced persons to their homes in the West Bank or Gaza, which has no bearing on the demographic balance inside Israel.
The declaration of Principles (DOP), signed by Israel and the PLO in 1993, allows for a discussion of the Palestinian refugee issue on two levels. The 1967 refuges are being discussed now through a quadripartite committee composed of Palestinians, Egyptians, Israelis, and Jordanians. The 1948 refugees are supposed to be discussed during the final status talks between the Palestinians and Israelis.
Through its history, Israel has adopted three interrelated approaches to the refugee issue. First, pretending indecisiveness and temporizing when called upon to respond to proposals bearing upon the return of Palestinian refugees, in particular the application of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, which calls for allowing the return of Palestinians refugees to their homeland and payment of compensation for those not wishing to go back. Second, creating facts on the ground which Israel used to confront external pressure from the international community and at the same time to nullify any decisions not to its liking. This strategy, which is a continuation of the Zionist movement's approach since the pre-48 period to the Palestine question generally, remains the most enduring feature of Israeli policies towards the Palestinians. Third, adopting bureaucratic procedure which obfuscate, if not complicate, the discussion of the issue and impede the implementation of any agreed upon procedure.
Underpinning these features are three arguments regularly used by Israel. The first is the argument of security extensively used to justify barring the return of refugees to both Israel and the PT. The second is the old argument of demography, which Israel has always invoked to justify the prevention of Palestinian refugees returning to their 1948 homes on the ground that this would threaten the Jewish character of the state. The third is the legal argument Israel and its supporters use to contend that the right of return, as stipulated in United Nations General Assembly resolution 194, does not apply to the Palestinian case.
Except for an offer made by Israel in 1948, under pressure from the USA to take back 100.000 of the 1948 refugees, no such overtures have been made by Israel since then. The offer at the time was rejected by the Arabs for its low ceiling and subsequently withdrawn by Israel. For nearly 50 years, Israel has consistently refused even to deal with the 1948 refugee issue except in the context of an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which it knew full well was a distant objective at that time. It is thus not surprising to find that Israel has succeeded in placing the 1948 refugees issue at the bottom of the DOP agenda, leaving it to the final status talks.
As for the 1948 refugees, whose fate according to the Oslo agreement is supposed to be dealt in the final status talks, there are no indicators that Israel is prepared to allow the return of any Palestinian refugee from 1948 to Israel proper. There is off-the-record talk that under certain conditions, Israel may allow the return of between 50.000-75.000 refugees, a very small percentage of the close to 2.7 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA, for symbolic reason to placate international public opinion.
However, this remains a remote possibility, for allowing the return of some minute number of refugees is constructed by Israel as an admission of guilt regarding their exodus in 1948 for which, officially, Israel is responsible. Some analysts, such as Slomo Gazit, an Israeli analyst, suggest that as a final gesture of ending the century-long conflict with the Palestinians, Israel should agree to either issue a statement or be a party to an international body, such as the General assembly at the United Nations, which would pass a resolution to replace Resolution 194 to acknowledge the human suffering of the Palestinian refugees. This however, is not supposed to be considered as an admission of culpability, the intent being merely to address the psychological and moral aspects of the refugee issue.
In other words, in the best of circumstances the Israeli position is unlikely to represent anything remotely close to the Palestinian position, or even that of other Arabs. At the end of the day, Israel will allows several thousands of Palestinian refugees from 1967 war to return by stretching their entry over a protracted period of time,Israel will focus primarily on the residents of the territories prior to 1967 and not those who were refugees from 1948 and found themselves second time refugees as a result of the 1967 war, nor those who left the territories during the interim period for visits, marriage, work, study or any other reasons.
While the Palestinians, supported by other governments, continue to refer to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, as of December 1993, the Americans, and before them the Israelis all along, have treated this resolutions as irrelevant to the settling of the refugee issue in the current frame work of the peace talks.
In other words, the main task now is how to dress up, or better dress down, Resolution 194 in order to diluite it and eventually remove it from the U.N. record.
The Palestinian position so far has been characterized by political, economic and organizational weakness, as well as lack of coordination with other Arab governements, and the absence of concrete and comprehensive plans to absorb returning refugees, whether of 1948 or 1967.
An honest and open debate on the refugee issue within the Palestinian refugees communities is imperative. This should involve a free, independent plebiscite to determine how marry refugees would actually want to exercise their right of return and how many would want to remain where they are provided their safety and fair treatment in their new environment are assumed. At minimum, the Palestinian National Authority should institute its own law of return and citizenship laws. A failure to resolve the refugee issue satisfactorily guarantees the protraction of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict into its second century.
