In September 1996, the implementation of the Oslo so called peace
agreement will enter its fourth year This May, the negotiations were supposed
to enter a decisive stage in determining the final shape and content of
the agreement.
Furthermore, these talks on the final agreement were meant to reveal Israel's
intentions regarding proposed solutions to the crucial questions of Palestinian
refugees, Jewish settlements, and Jerusalem. It was also hoped that the
remaining 4,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israel would finally be released.
But the Labor Party, spared us the suspense. Under preelection pressure
to appease rightwing Israeli voters, Labor publicized its version of the
outline of the final agreement foolishly, and not taking into consideration
that the rightwing Likud might win, Labor revealed that there is not much
to negotiate beyond the two Oslo agreement. In doing this, Labor shot itself
in the foot; now its supporters and allies in the peace process, including
the Palestinian Authority, cannot moan that "had Labor won, things
would be different".
Let us take a look at what Labor was willing to offer: On the question
of Palestinian refilgees and the right of return: Clear cut: no right of
return. Negotiations only on the fate of Palestinians who became refugees
in the 1967 war and fled from the West Bank to Jordan. Labor's solution
for the 1948 refugees is citizenship in their countries of refuge.
On the question of settlements: Most settlements (90%) will remain under
Israeli sovereighty.
On the question of Jerusalem: both the eastern and the western sections
of the city will remain Israel's undivided capital.
I would like to concentrate on the lessdiscussed subject of the Palestinian
refugees . Here we have one of the most unique stories in history. After
their expulsion from Palestine in 1948 and their concentration in refugee
camps in the neighboring Arab countries, Palestinians refused to give up
their UNRWA-allotted refugee cards and resettle as citizens of their host
countries. This was not in order to safeguard the meagre food rations that
they were receiving from UNRWA, but to hold on to their only hope of ever
returning home to Palestine As long as they, their children and their grandchildren
were considered refugees, their return could be guaranteed. The minute
they seek citizenship in a host country, their case as refugees would be
dropped. That is why their camps, schools, and hospitals were all named
after their old villages and towns in Palestine. The United Nations estimates
that in September 1949 there were 726,000 Palestinian refugees outside
the armistice lines. While Israel claimed to have no responsibility towards
them, that the burden of their solution lies on the Arab countries, these
people bonded together with the hope of return.
In 1968 the modern PLO emerged, offering the Palestinians a national program
to bind their aspirations together and to turn their tragedy from that
of a humanitarian problem into a national political problem in need of
a solution.
This was exactly the aspect which Israel fought (and is still fighting).
For a refugee problem is one thing, but a national movement is another.
From then on, the PLO was Israel's target Its leaders were hunted and assassinated
abroad and its members were arrested in the Occupied Territories. By crushing
the PLO, Israel thought it could eliminate the Palestinian demand for justice
and selfdetermination. For almost three decades a fateful battle has continued,
culminating in the 1987 popular uprising the Intifada. A Palestinian victory,
in a form of a Palestinian state with the right of return, would mean that
Israel would have to admit the historic sin that it inflicted on the Palestinians.
Israel is still unwilling to do this, even after the so called peace process,
and this is why there is no difference between Labor and Likud.
The Israeli (Zionist) side had a decisive victory on September 13 1993
Yasser Arafat, head of the PLO acknowledged Israel's right to exist without
acknowledging the Palestinian right to self-determination and the right
of return. In one stroke of the pen, and one famous handshake, he not only
accepted Israel's version of historic truth but betrayed the people, the
real heroes, whose cause he supposedly represented for so long - those
people who held on to their refugee cards for 44 years (19481993).
Now Israel could publicly define the conflict as it always has: not as
a conflict between the state of Israel and the Palestinian people as a
whole, but as a conflict between Israel and 2 million Palestinians residing
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under the MadridOslo concept, the fate
of the 4 million Palestinian refugees who have been displaced and dispossessed
for 48 years has been transformed. Once considered the numberone national
problem, recognized internationally, and the reason for the creation of
the PLO, the refugees have become a mere humanitarian issue, to be solved
by the Arab states or left to the mercy of immigration offices around the
world.
Unfortunately, Oslo is not a solution, it leads not to statehood, but to
a reorganization of the occupation. According to the Oslo concept of the
New Middle East, Israel will normalize its relations with all the neighboring
Arab states and advance in the economic conquest of their markets. The
Palestinians, meanwhile, will be forced to accept a Bantustan solution
for onethird of its people, who are still regarded as a "surplus population".
Likud's victory reveals the wretched gamble taken by Arafat and his close
advisors. They went as far as agreeing to crucial segments of the Palestinian
Charter to appease Israeli public opinion and to safeguard Labor's victory
in the election. These concessions to Israel further weakened the Palestinian
claim by portraying the Palestinians, and not the Israelis, as the aggressors
in this conflict. The tragic lesson learned from Arafat's betrayal is that
Palestinians must continue to raise their refugee cards high, that the
world will acknowledge that the problem is far from being solved.
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